

TITLE PAGE

**Emotion and Cognition in the Development of Jewish Identity:
A Psychological Inquiry**

Mordecai Nisan

Your people will be my people, and your God my God (Ruth 1:16)

Translated by Gila Svirsky

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Author's Note

This paper is based on a lecture I gave at the Avi Hai Foundation to an audience of educators and others who deal with issues of Jewish identity in Israel.

Following the lecture, I received many requests for a written summary of my remarks. The avid interest evinced in this issue, the many reactions to the lecture, and particularly the need for discussion and examination of this subject from a psychological-developmental perspective all catalyzed the writing of this paper. It is intended for anyone with an interest in the development of Jewish identity in the individual, especially those involved in the many branches of education.

I am grateful to Annette Hochstein, President of the Mandel Foundation – Israel, who encouraged me to write this paper, and to my colleagues over the years at the Mandel Leadership Institute and the School of Education of Hebrew University, who enriched my thinking about this subject. Special thanks to Gila Svirsky for her thoughtful translation as well as her insightful substantive comments.

Mordecai Nisan is the Samuel Melton Professor Emeritus of Developmental and Educational Psychology at Hebrew University. He is former Dean of the School of Education of Hebrew University and Academic Director of the Mandel Leadership Institute. Professor Nisan has been a member of the Council for Higher Education and various public committees in the field of education. His main areas of research interest and writing are moral development and behavior, perception of the “desirable” as a factor in motivation, and preserving identity as a guiding principle in human behavior. Professor Nisan was a visiting scholar at Harvard and Oxford Universities, the Max-Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in Palo Alto.

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Introduction

Jewish identity is a wondrous phenomenon. Why do individuals affiliate themselves with the Jewish collective when this affiliation often brings suffering and constrains their lives; when the history of belonging to the Jewish collective is suffused with oppression and physical injury; when there is no real common bond, not even territorial or linguistic, among the members of this collective; when there is harsh dissension between members of the group over values and beliefs. By reason, these should eradicate any desire to belong to the Jewish collective, yet the desire persists and does not dissipate (among those remaining in the collective) throughout a long history. Indeed, Jewish identity is a riddle, one with several facets – historical-philosophical, sociological-anthropological, and other. This monograph offers a starting point for understanding another facet of the riddle – psychological-developmental. It does not attempt to grapple directly with the riddle, which continues to lurk and periodically appears. The purpose of this paper, rather, is to understand the phenomenon of Jewish identity, and perhaps gain a deeper understanding of other collective identities (such as national or ethnic) from a psychological perspective by looking at the process of its development in the individual. I present two approaches to understanding the development of an individual's Jewish identity, propose their integration into a third approach, and discuss some characteristics and implications of this synthesis. The paper opens by clarifying the concept of collective identity as I use it (Part 1) and briefly surveys the role of emotions in explaining behavior (Part 2). I then present a cognitive-developmental approach that places cognition as the basis of Jewish identity, and note the limitations of this approach (Part 3). This is followed (Part 4) by presentation of an approach that bases Jewish identity on emotion – what I call the “affect approach” – but even this does

not fully explain the phenomenon. I thus return (in Part 5) to the cognitive aspect of collective identity and elucidate the need, reason, and way to integrate the cognitive component into what seems to me to be the basis of collective identity – the feeling of belonging to the group. The synthesis I present suggests a framework for a social-emotional approach to the development of Jewish identity (Part 6). I then discuss possible conflicts between emotion and cognition in Jewish identity (Part 7). And I conclude (Part 8) by considering some insights and implications for Jewish identity that emerge from the approach proposed in this paper.

1. The concept of identity and collective identity

The term *identity* has a range of meanings, but what seems common to all is an individual's awareness of being an agent whose existence shows continuity, consistency, and distinctiveness from others. These characteristics of identity were articulated by Erik Erikson, who established the importance of this concept in psychology and other social sciences. Since the development of this concept by Erikson in the 1950s, many studies have noted its complexity as well as its contribution to understanding the individual, his behavior and creativity. In this paper, I use the term *identity* in a specific way, distinguishing it from closely aligned concepts such as ego, personality, and self-image. Personal identity, as I use the term here, is an individual's definition (or awareness) of what is significant to him in his self, what is of profound importance to him, the qualities without which he would view himself as someone else. Accordingly, I define Jewish identity, which is one of many components in an individual's personal identity, as the perception by an individual that his Jewishness, his belonging to the Jewish collective, is an important component of his existence. This definition will be clarified below.

This meaning of Jewish identity embodies at least four complementary characteristics: (a) the individual's Jewish identity is a subjective mental phenomenon; it is embedded in the individual's consciousness and therefore not, in this sense, dependent on external recognition of it. Thus, someone can feel a strong sense of Jewish identity even when this is not recognized by the surrounding society; conversely, an individual can feel no Jewish identity although society ascribes one to him; (b) the subjective perception of identity is not intended only for one's own awareness of self – indeed, it is directed not only at oneself, but at a group of people, present or absent – the identity group. An individual who identifies as Jewish feels part of the Jewish collective – this group has significance in his life; (c) an individual

considers his identity to be important, a constitutive characteristic of his existence. The importance ascribed to this characteristic is what imbues it with status in his personal identity. Characteristics not important to one's owner, such as having blue eyes, will not be perceived as part of one's identity. An individual with Jewish identity feels that his belonging to the Jewish collective is an important component of his personality; and (d) identity has a normative dimension. It is not confined to "who am I and what is important to me", but incorporates "and what implications does this have for my life, my conduct". A personality component that an individual regards as important has value for him; and when he ascribes value to a component of his personality, he feels he ought to behave in a way consistent with it. An individual with a "collective identity" (hereinafter used to mean an individual whose sense of belonging to a specific group is so important that it is part of his identity) feels he ought to act to sustain and promote this group. This feeling differs from a moral obligation: it more closely resembles an "imperfect duty", in the words of Kant, or "things without measure" in Jewish tradition, such as the duty to be charitable, without stipulating when or how much, which is left to the individual. The first three characteristics mentioned above are inherent in the very meaning of the concept *identity* as given above; the normative characteristic derives from them and has empirical corroboration. It was found, for example, that adolescent respondents expect (in a normative sense) that a youth who defines himself as Jewish and considers this important to him would prefer to participate in a demonstration on behalf of Jewish matters rather than engage in an activity that is merely enjoyable (such as watching a basketball game). If he does not behave accordingly, he is perceived as "spineless" or not true to himself. Indeed respondents having a strong Jewish identity (by verbal indicators) assert that they ought to be involved in "Jewish" activity, and are in fact more involved than respondents with a weak Jewish identity.

Personal identity includes many types of components – to each individual, his or her identity components. Many have an ideological component – those who define themselves as socialists view this as an essential ingredient; many have a professional component, such as educators whose work is core to how they perceive themselves; and there is a collective component among those whose national, ethnic, or cultural belonging are critical to their image of themselves. Unlike ideological or professional components, regarded as the product of one's choosing, the collective-national component is imposed on the individual – one is flung into a particular family and nation, as Sartre noted – from which one cannot extricate oneself. Through the course of life, however, an individual senses he has some freedom in choosing how much importance to ascribe to this component – great importance, espousing it as part of one's identity, or merely reconciling oneself to an ineluctable fate; after all, one could choose to ignore or even renounce this component, though such a choice is not easy. An individual with a Jewish identity in the way it is used here is one who with prior intent or ex post-facto defines himself as a Jew and ascribes to it importance in his life. For this individual, Jewishness is part of what molds him; a part to which he is committed; a part he feels he cannot forsake or exchange for another except at the price of undermining his sense of selfhood or personality. Sometimes this self-definition is conscious and articulated, and sometimes it finds expression only in behavior and feelings. A person with a Jewish identity will not renounce it; he will feel happiness and pride when the Jewish collective or a part of it succeeds (in his estimation) and will feel sorrow and shame when the collective or a part of it fails.

It is important to distinguish between this internal meaning of the concept of Jewish identity and the external meaning. In the external meaning, Jewish identity is based on validation from an external source. This source can be formal, as in the political-

religious debate (around issues like the Law of Return). Or it can be informal, as when an individual perceives himself to be Jewish just because society attributes this identity to him. The two meanings, internal and external, do not necessarily overlap. An individual can be a Jew formally and accepted by society as a Jew, but feel no affinity for his Judaism and even want to shed it. Or an individual can formally be considered non-Jewish, such as the son of a non-Jewish mother who did not convert to Judaism or one not accepted by society as a Jew, but who nevertheless considers himself Jewish. This paper, as noted, will deal with Jewish identity in its internal meaning, rooted in the emotional and behavioral life of the individual. In this sense, an individual has a Jewish identity when he feels a sense of belonging to the Jewish collective and considers this important to him. I shall try to examine the nature of an individual's affinity and commitment to his Judaism – what is its process of development, what is its source, and what constitutes it psychologically. Hence the present discussion refrains from engaging in a debate about the definition of Jewish identity. Although the present analysis may be of value for examining collective identity in general, the focus here is on Jewish identity. The current paper is based on a psychological analysis of issues related to this subject and on empirical studies using diverse methods – from introspection and personal interviews to controlled experiments (a list of selected references appears at the end of this paper).

For this investigation, I use moral psychology as a model for understanding the psychology of Jewish identity. The two fields resemble each other in several important ways, and the rich body of research on the psychology of morality can help us understand Jewish identity – little touched by psychological research. Let me note several similarities between Jewish identity, in the sense that I am using it, and morality as a psychological phenomenon: Jewish identity, like morality, is an internal feeling that evolves through

an individual's socialization in the culture in which he was raised, and is based on given dispositions. The feeling manifests itself in the individual's foci of attention, judgments, and behavior. Jewish identity, like morality, is normative – it is not only an indication of belonging to a collective, but also a guide to behavior. A sense of commitment is a formative component of both identity and morality. As such, Jewish identity can also arouse in the individual feelings of guilt, shame, or discomfort when his conduct is not in accord with expectations, or alternatively can arouse feelings of satisfaction and self-validation when it does. And like morality, collective identity also has individual and collective facets. The individual facet is the commitment of the individual to himself, a commitment that seems independent of social rewards. The collective facet is a commitment to the group – one's group or humanity in general. Morality and identity develop in a social context and in relations between the individual and others. Although the individual's commitment to the identity group is actually directed toward himself, it derives from his sense of membership in a group. Thus deviating from a claim stemming from one's identity – like a moral deviation – arouses feelings of guilt, shame, or discomfort that have two aspects: individual – guilt and shame before oneself, and social – shame before others.

A striking change in the field of moral psychology over the past decade, one that came about as a result of new ideas and findings, some of them revolutionary, was conferral of a central role on emotion in the development of moral functioning – from awareness of the existence of a moral problem, through moral judgment, to moral behavior. In light of the aforementioned resemblance, one can presumably learn from the field of morality about Jewish identity and collective identity in general. I therefore continue with a brief discussion about the role of emotion in relation to one's identity group in explaining behavior, and will make note of the position I am taking.

2. On the role of emotion in research about collective identity

In the wake of World War II, psychological interest grew in the subject of collective identity. Most research focused on negative aspects of the phenomenon – discrimination, prejudice, and the hostility that can grow out of collective identity. A good example of this is research by Tajfel and his colleagues, who showed how collective identity that was created artificially by arbitrarily separating people into two groups engenders competition between the groups to the extent of each group's being willing to accept a lower reward than they could otherwise have received, to ensure that the other group receives less. Tajfel attributed this to the desire to increase self-esteem by enhancing the superiority of one's own group – through earning a larger reward. His experiments show that the feelings that accompany group identity are a source of hostility between groups and the evils that arise from this.

This perception of the impact of emotion on the individual's behavior conforms to the pervasive (though not sole) view in western culture as reflected in the writings of philosophers from Plato through Hobbes and Kant and to our day – a belief that emotion and desire impede rational and moral thinking and behavior. Freud corroborated this view by presenting drives and emotions as unruly forces that require constant supervision and restraint (thereby draining emotional reserves needed for worthy activity). Even among contemporaries, we find expressions like "emotion overcame reason", implying that emotional interference must be restrained by rational thinking. The characteristics of emotions – immediacy, transience, partiality, influenced by specific stimuli while ignoring the context, and the difficulty of controlling them – lead to perceiving them as inferior, clouding judgment, and harming behavior. This view is reinforced by psychological experiments in areas such as biased thinking or the link between frustration and aggression.

Toward the end of the previous century, however, and in light of neuro-psychological and other research, the perception of emotion in philosophy and psychology underwent a radical change. Researchers from many fields noted the pervasive and profound presence of emotion in human functioning and, above all, the vital and positive contribution they make to adapting to reality, decision making, and creativity. In an article that heralded this revolution, the psychologist Zajonc argued that the first reaction of an individual to any situation is emotional (in this paper I do not distinguish between levels and types of emotion). This first reaction is automatic and quick – it determines the issues and options, informs their processing and interpretation, and motivates and guides behavior – whether to approach or avoid the stimulus. Thus, after a long era when cognition reigned supreme in research about judgment and behavior, including moral judgment, emotion has now been restored to its rightful place, in recognition (also) of its positive influence over the entire life of an individual, such as being considerate of others. This trend informs the present examination of the role of emotion, together with cognition, in the field of Jewish identity. In this sense, this paper can also be seen as a response to research that presents collective identity – particularly nationalist – in a negative light, as a construct in which hostility and envy toward the other predominate. This is a partial and biased view; it ignores key aspects of this identity and, more importantly, its natural basis.

3. A cognitive approach to collective identity

Discussions about Jewish identity generally revolve around the cognitive component. The key question in this debate has been “who is a Jew” in its formal and philosophical meaning, with relatively little attention paid to the psychological meaning. Philosophers and historians have pointed to elements in thought, culture, and way of life that appeared key and perhaps necessary for characterizing an individual’s or group’s Jewish identity and its status. Social scientists, on the other hand, have investigated the status and importance of specific factors in the individual and collective perception of Jewish identity. The factors examined in these studies are the to-be-expected shared elements: ethnic origin, historical memory, religion, norms and values, language and culture, common fate, connection to Israel, and others. These analyses suggest the richness and complexity of the cognitive – content – side of Jewish identity. This side also includes inquiries such as: Who is included in this group and what entitles entry to it; what if any are its core characteristics – the beliefs, values, and way of life that constitute it; what are expressions of Jewish identity; what is expected or required of group members; why is belonging to the group important and worthy, etc. Moreover, investigating and thinking about these topics are not just a matter for scholars, but for laypersons as well. Indeed, some believe it is their Jewish identity that leads them to raise and consider such matters.

Development of identity according to the cognitive approach.

Exploring the cognitive side of Jewish identity reflects a cognitive approach to the issue. According to this approach, cognition – memory, beliefs, understanding, and thought – are the basis and core of Jewish identity. This approach refers us to the cognitive-developmental theory concerning morality, the product of research by Piaget and Kohlberg. According to this theory, Jewish identity is based on the natural tendency of the human from early childhood

to understand and give meaning to his life and surroundings, including group affiliations. The cognitive development of an individual plays a critical role in his collective identity.

The cognitive-developmental approach can help explain the emergence of an individual's Jewish identity, as follows: In the process of development, the child learns to distinguish between itself and others, a distinction that forms the basis for its individual identity, and later it learns to distinguish between its own and other families. These distinctions are initially based on a physical and emotional closeness to its family, a shared home and consumption, and the shared experiences of living together; with cognitive development, including a perception of time, identity comes to be based on more abstract attributes such as understanding the blood ties, common history and fate, and shared plans for the future. A key factor in the experience and development of the child and youth is the discourse within and outside the home – a discourse that leads the child or youth to perceive the social world as divided into groups. Perception of the group to which one belongs with its unique characteristics is broadened to incorporate the extended family, members of the community and country, and ultimately a grasp of nationality. The national collective resembles the family group in several important characteristics such as common memories, a shared fate, similar values and way of life, a common culture (generally also language), and more. The group to which one belongs may or may not have a “realistic” basis such as blood ties or shared life and territory. One core element in the sense of belonging to the kind of group discussed here is the perception of a common memory and fate. In any event, membership in this group is a social construct, one that provides legitimacy and meaning to the group. The child and eventually the youth and adult associate themselves with a collective in recognition of the deep affinity between themselves and the group.

With cognitive development, the child, adolescent and adult not only interpret the reality of their lives, but also observe it as if they are outsiders. This observation is based on the ability and tendency of an individual to see things from the point of view of the other, or to assume the role of the other, in psychological terms. When they observe from this outside perspective, the child and youth distinguish between “our” group and others, and through searching, exploration, and logical deduction, they reach the conclusion about a bond, dependence, or mutual responsibility for members of their own group. This is the basis for the element of commitment in identity. Recognition by the individual that he is part of a group with common characteristics and fate, with mutual dependence among the members, leads him to the conclusion that every member of the group bears responsibility for its existence. The similarity to moral development (as described by the cognitive approach) is obvious.

The cognitive approach to the development of collective identity therefore emphasizes the ongoing process of exploration, clarification, construction, and deduction – the individual’s cognitive activity in constructing his identity; the information received, sought, and processed for constructing this identity; links between the individual’s perceptions and those acceptable to the collective; the individual’s internal identity conflicts and how he grapples with them. These are all questions that have been studied in the field of individual identity and will not be addressed here. For our purposes it is important to say that according to this approach, Jewish identity is based on the collection of knowledge, beliefs, values, and rationales related to identity, which will be discussed below in the section on “complementary cognitive components”.

Functioning of collective identity according to the cognitive approach. The role of cognition according to this approach is not merely in forming and developing collective identity; cognition

continues to be a key factor in an individual's functioning – evaluations, judgments, and behavior related to one's Jewish identity. This has two facets – commitment and expressions of one's identity. During his lifetime, an individual will encounter experiences that relate to his Jewish identity (such as a request to sign a petition or encountering a book about Maimonides) and opportunities to express this identity (such as initiating such activities). When his attention is caught by such an opportunity, he will judge it from the perspective of the general Jewish collective and his personal perspective as a Jew: Will this contribute to the collective? Does this obligate him as someone of Jewish identity to any sort of behavior? Is this an opportunity to give expression to his identity? Sometimes the individual will grasp this opportunity as an imperative and sometimes as not obligatory. In any event, considerations from the perspective of his Jewish identity will be weighed against considerations from other perspectives – moral, utilitarian for himself, and the like. The cognitive approach posits that in every instance, judgment and decision will be based – as is proper for rational judgments – on the totality of considerations of the individual, including those inconsistent with considerations derived from his Jewish identity. The decision will be made according to a balancing of these factors. The stronger an individual's collective identity – the more and deeper its cognitive elements – the greater weight this consideration will have in his decision, and the greater loyalty he will show to the group; he will defend it, for example, and not abandon it even when it is defeated.

The foregoing suggests that according to the cognitive approach, one cannot talk about Jewish identity without recognizing the contents that create the Jewish collective – their meaning, interpretation, and rationale. The sense of belonging to the Jewish collective is constructed by the child or adult out of awareness of the shared basis of the group. Studying the content

of this basis, whether intentionally or not, is what constructs and strengthens the cognitive structure we call "Jewish identity". This structure has stability over time, which is what allows for us to refer to "the Jewish identity of the individual". From the cognitive approach it appears, therefore, that the way to acquire, deepen, and evaluate Jewish identity is through cognition. Attentiveness and sensitivity of the individual to Jewish affairs and the importance he accords them in decision making will depend on his awareness of the cognitive basis of this identity as well as the validity and importance he ascribes to it.

The cognitive approach does not, of course, preclude the existence of an emotional component to Jewish identity, but emotion is accorded secondary status. First, because it is derived from cognition – the memories, beliefs, thoughts and expectations related to being Jewish. Second, it is perceived as serving cognition – emotion draws attention to relevant stimuli and arouses the individual to act, sometimes in an unrestrained way. Some even perceive emotion to be an inferior and dangerous byproduct of collective identity, an opiate of the masses that rests on and reinforces hostility and parochialism – a view supported by historical cases whose memories have not faded. The true essence of Jewish identity, according to the cognitive approach, is embedded in cognitive processes, not in the emotional processes that accompany them.

But is this the case? Is cognition the foundation and building block of Jewish identity, as would be claimed by cognitive theorists? I offer here two counterclaims to the argument that cognition is central to the development and functioning of Jewish identity. The first derives from the meaning (and definition) of Jewish identity as posed in this paper; the second stems from questions about the motivation for collective identity.

Critique of the cognitive approach. As Jewish identity is defined here, drawn from the subjective perception of the individual,

cognitive processes and contents are not necessary or sufficient for an individual to have such an identity. We distinguish, of course, between a broad, educated, and profound Jewish identity and a narrow, superficial one (an issue we shall return to later); but even people whose identity does not rest on thought or knowledge may be viewed by others and themselves as having a “complete” Jewish identity (though not a mature one). We can imagine (and we know) people who do not think about their Jewish identity reflectively, “from the outside”, and whose knowledge about or interest in the subject of Jewish identity is slight, yet we cast no doubt on their Jewish identity. So long as they *feel* that their Jewishness, their belonging to the Jewish collective, is an important and essential component of their lives, one that involves commitment, we recognize them as having a Jewish identity; they themselves have no doubt about it. In parallel, one can imagine and even name people who are knowledgeable and erudite about Jewish culture and identity, but are not perceived as having Jewish identity because they do not “feel” themselves to be Jews. The Jewish issue may even be very important to them, but they have no feeling of belonging or commitment to the Jewish collective.

This critique of the cognitive approach does not deny the existence of cognitive components at the very earliest stage of collective identity, particularly recognition of the distinctiveness of one’s own group from others, and of belonging to that group. But these cognitive elements are thin. They are on the borderline between perception and cognition. Awareness of the distinctiveness of the group and belonging to it do not require active thinking and reasoning. This is also true of commitment to Jewish identity. Commitment can grow out of reasoning and deduction or it can arise from feelings and emotions that are not the product of complex thinking. Commitment to Jewish identity is not necessarily based on reason, justification, or logic. It can be a primal given that requires no justification or explanation,

so that one says, "My Jewishness is very important to me. Why? I don't know; because that's how I feel; that's who I am, period."

And the second objection, in continuation of the first: Jewish identity is not composed merely of cognition, knowledge, or understanding, no matter how extensive these may be. A critical factor in Jewish identity is commitment. Without commitment, there would be no need for the concept "identity"; "belonging" would be sufficient. Jewish identity is not (only) a discourse of one with oneself about "Who am I and what is the nature of my Jewishness?" Jewish identity also raises the question, not necessarily consciously, "As a Jew, what is expected of me?" And even "What are my duties?" For there are expectations of those with Jewish identity, expectations placed both by oneself and by others, expectations that will reflect and confirm the identity in one's behavior. The clearest expectation – in secular society – is that the individual remain part of the collective, and not abandon it; but beyond this, an individual with Jewish identity is expected to give positive expression to his identity – as he grasps it – when able to and called upon. Here the factor of motivation comes in. The definition and description of Jewish identity must include a motivation factor. The cognitive approach originates in the Socratic assumption that cognition motivates the individual to behavior – that knowing what is good and virtuous will lead to behavior that is good and virtuous. Specifically, the cognitive claim is that an individual's motivation to behave in accordance with what is expected of him by his Jewish identity derives from his cognizance of the reasons for this conduct, such as: the role of his parents, community, and nation in molding him as a person of culture; the unique value of the culture of the collective in which he developed; and his loyalty and responsibility to members of the collective with whom he shares a common past, present, and often future. However, this argument remains at the level of cognition, and does not bridge between cognition and

behavior. Based on experience and empirical research, it is clear that without this bridge, thought will not influence behavior. The weakness of the cognitive argument is clear from studies that show only a weak link between the level of moral judgment (which can be seen as reflecting the depth of moral understanding and thought) and moral behavior. These findings are consistent with daily experience, which suggests that someone can be very moral (over time, in intention and behavior) even without well developed moral thinking, or conversely can have well developed moral thinking and be immoral. These findings challenge the claims of the cognitive approach to morality.

The same difficulty exists regarding Jewish identity. The cognitive approach does not explain the element of motivation in Jewish identity, and we noted that commitment is a formative element in collective identity. Comparison with the field of morality strengthens our belief that in the field of Jewish identity, too, there is no correlation between the cognitive plane, which includes beliefs, understanding, and thinking about the subject, and the motivational plane, which includes desires and their expression in behavior. Indeed, psychological research reveals only weak correlations between cognitive factors in ethnic identity and the behavior expressing them. How then can we explain an individual's clinging and commitment to his collective identity, when these are not reinforced by reward and punishment or by social norms in broad consensus? Why doesn't he throw them off when they bind him? There are, of course, deterrents to shedding one's collective identity, including social condemnation and ostracism. On the other hand, there are situations in which loyalty to Jewish identity exacts a heavy price, with no visible cost for shedding it, and yet the individual still persists in his identity. Another claim is that the individual's desire to preserve his collective identity stems from his appreciation for the content of that identity, an appreciation that from the outset – according

to the cognitive approach – was the basis of his identity. But this begs the question, and is our very inquiry: Why does the individual persist in this appreciation of collective identity despite the conditions and factors opposing them, at least *prima facie*?

We can conclude from the aforesaid that cognition in the psychological-developmental sense of the term is not the basis of Jewish identity. Cognition alone cannot explain the phenomenon of collective identity. At first glance this conclusion is surprising, as it contradicts a major portion of the scholarship, experiments, and educational studies about Jewish identity. At second glance, however, it appears compelling; it is consistent with the actual practice of how people relate to Jewish identity, as described above in our critique of the cognitive approach. The question therefore remains: What is the basis of Jewish identity for people who are both well informed and uneducated, for those who accept the body of *mitzvot* [religious commandments] and those who reject it, for those who anchor their Jewish identity in Jewish culture and those who anchor it in a universal social mission, for those who connect it to their lives in Zion and those who find no need to affix it, notwithstanding its great importance to them, to any content beyond their feelings? The common ground for all these is the sense of belonging to the Jewish nation and its importance to them. But what is the source and nature of this feeling if not cognition?

4. The affect approach to collective identity

The flaws in the cognitive approach are the point of departure for what I call the “affect approach”. This approach asserts that emotion is the basis and framework for the construction of Jewish identity. According to the cognitive approach, the emotional component of Jewish identity derives from cognition and therefore is of secondary status, while according to the affect approach, the emotional component of Jewish identity (the *feeling* of belonging to the group) is primary, and cognitive contents are constructed upon this feeling (including identity components, as will be described below). We see this in Ruth the Moabite’s declaration of joining the community of Naomi, her mother-in-law: Ruth first declares “Your people shall be my people”, an emotionally charged declaration of belonging, followed by “Your god shall be my god”, i.e., the cognitive component of the identity she adopts.

The place of affect in Jewish identity. How one experiences Jewish identity, as revealed in personal interviews and literature, is through emotion – feelings of closeness and concern, connection and commitment, joy and sorrow, desire and motivation – thereby justifying use of the word *identity* rather than simple *belonging*. An individual can know clearly that he belongs to a particular group, such as the group of Jerusalemites, without this generating any excitement, without this being so important that he would refuse to give it up, without feeling that this is part of his identity. The significance that an individual ascribes to his Jewish identity is not a matter of cognition alone – comparable to an “objective” judge’s understanding that the theory of relativity is of great importance – but a personal matter of emotional import – similar to the joy of a mother at her son’s success. In experiencing Jewish identity, the individual feels that belonging to the Jewish collective touches him, he cares about it. That is the difference between an individual who merely belongs to a group and one who identifies with it, whose life story is interwoven with it. What

is the source of this feeling of import (in the sense of emotionally caring)? Why does an individual with collective identity, in this case Jewish identity, attribute importance to it, and thereby confer value upon belonging to this collective?

The common psychological explanation tends to be consequentialist (results-based). According to this explanation, the value of belonging to a group derives from the utilitarian ends (reinforcement or satisfaction) that belonging brings and is expected to bring the individual. Belonging to the group has “results” both in the internal and external world of the individual – some of them contributing to his welfare and some harming it. During the course of his experience in a family and society, the individual learns the connection between belonging to a particular group and the consequences of that belonging, and he accordingly attributes a positive (or negative) value to belonging to this group. According to this explanation, belonging to the group has no value in and of itself; without the usefulness or satisfaction the individual derives from it in the past and expects to derive from it in the future, the group would have no value for him. Belonging to a group can indeed carry a variety of positive rewards, from material through social, giving meaning and content to life, or increased self-esteem. In parallel, abandoning the group can carry negative rewards, sometimes quite severe. It is therefore reasonable to claim that belonging to a group is important to the individual for instrumental reasons and purposes – as a tool to achieve desired results, including self-enhancement. However, a careful examination of Jewish identity reveals that in many cases, the value that an individual ascribes to it is internal, not external: Belonging to a group is important to him for its own sake, not because of the outcomes. This is the most direct and reasonable explanation for the fact that many people choose to maintain their Jewish identity, or other collective identity, even when no external rewards are to be had

or that identity may lead to suffering and humiliation, of which they are aware. This conclusion also emerges from an analysis of interviews on the subject of Jewish identity: The value an individual ascribes to belonging to the collective is constructed on the feeling of an unmediated connection to it, an attachment of sharing and identification, not self-interest. I will return to this below.

On the feeling of belonging to the group. The phenomenon of emotional attachment to a group resembles and perhaps is related to the (heavily researched) area of the child's attachment to its mother and other meaningful people in its life. But while the child's attachment is to specific caregivers, emotional attachment to a group is to a category of people, most of whom he does not know. Forerunners of this attachment can perhaps be seen in the finding that 6-month-old infants show a preference for strangers who speak their language over strangers speaking a foreign tongue. Attachment to a group as a category of people emerges later in human development and its sources are varied. I will mention three that come up in psychological research: (1) Attachment to a group can stem from a natural tendency of the individual to connect with a group with whom he shares a common denominator (from language to a common memory) or to a group to which he "belongs" according to messages received from those close to him. (2) Attachment can result from a unique type of learning that leads to internalization of a bond to the group: This would be "deep" learning in the sense that the attachment learned becomes autonomous – it thrives on internal reinforcement and is not dependent on external reinforcement or sanction. This kind of attachment is stable; in the language of learning theory, it is resistant to extinction. The term *identification* for Freud was intended to explain learning of this particular type. Such learning is required, according to Freud, to explain the emergence of the superego and the

gender identity of the individual, both internalized and stable constructs in the personality. (3) Another type of learning of this kind is the acquisition of behavioral, emotional, or cognitive constructs by repeated exposure (also through stories or social discourse buttressed by beliefs or “socially accepted” concepts) to common behavior patterns in the culture, including the excitement generated every time the subject of attachment to the group comes up. The child or adolescent accepts as givens these beliefs, concepts, and behavior patterns, but lacks consciousness of them – they are “internalized”. The aforementioned ways of learning will affect the strength and intensity of the attachment. The attachment will depend on factors like the frequency, salience, and intensity of the experiences and emotions that the individual is exposed to in his life. (People who join the Jewish collective as adults show additional types of collective identity acquisition.)

The argument that an individual has a relatively stable emotional attachment to a collective is consistent with sociological and evolutionary studies that reveal the sense of belonging to a “large group” to be a fundamental aspect of social life, and one with functional advantages that lead to its emergence. Durkheim had already claimed that attachment to a group that sets norms of behavior is a condition for normative behavior as well as a healthy and happy life. Like attachment to a family, attachment to a national group provides the individual with a safe and egalitarian anchor – this attachment is not transient or conditional upon achievement, it cannot be stripped from the individual, and it forms the basis for a sense of solidarity with the group. Attachment to a group is perceived as a universal characteristic. The individual is not just a social animal, created and existing thanks to bonds with other people, but also a group animal, created and existing thanks to an involuntary, ineluctable attachment to a distinct group – its language, memory, ways of thinking, culture, and distinctive way of life.

We said that attachment to the group emerges from an individual's "disposition" – a disposition for direct attachment to the group, for internalized learning as a kind of Freudian identification, or for the acquisition of patterns of behavior, emotion, and thinking that prevail in the culture. But we must emphasize at the outset that this predisposition is yet unformed and can be filled with very different types of content. Two key factors in this process are social structures, including institutions, and social norms (also manifested in the behavior of the parents). Society already exerts an influence in determining the group to which the individual will belong – the community, culture, religion, nation, or other category – the products of social construction and historical conditions. A group can have rigid, impermeable borders or soft, porous borders that allow for passage and joining another group; and belonging to a group can be channeled into an orientation of hostility and rivalry, or neutrality, or friendship and cooperation. The disposition to feel emotional attachment to a group is therefore a kind of substratum on which all sorts of structures can be constructed. The character of these structures is largely set by society (although one's personal experiences also play a part). To illustrate, we again turn to morality. Studies in this field indicate a "disposition" for moral development in the form of natural tendencies for empathy and avoidance of injuring the other. However, translating these into moral norms and laws is different in each group. The "natural" tendencies are like clay in the hands of the culture, which can shape and even radically change them. This is presumably also true regarding the disposition to feel a sense of belonging to a group.

Attachment to a group is a type of affect. We compared it to the attachment of a child to its mother and to empathy, both emotional states. The attachment of a child to its mother is an ongoing emotion, but also influenced by the surrounding conditions – certain situations, such as the appearance of a

stranger, arouse the child to emotional expressions more powerful than this attachment. Empathy, on the other hand, is transient, evoked in a specific situation such as seeing a person in distress; but empathy can also be an ongoing emotion, as in relation to a loved one. According to the approach proposed here, Jewish identity is generally based on a continuous, positive, relatively stable emotion that an individual feels toward the Jewish collective; an emotion that becomes more powerful in certain situations, such as when the collective is under threat. What is the nature of this emotion? Many emotions are not given to a precise linguistic formulation. This is also true for an individual's feeling toward his identity group. Among the words available, *love* seems to be the most appropriate to describe this emotion. Jewish identity, meaning the emotion of belonging to the Jewish collective, is expressed in love for the Jewish collective by a person who is part of it (similar to love of one's family). An individual with a collective identity wants the group to prosper and flourish, is happy when it succeeds and sad when it fails, angry at those that harm it, sympathetic with those who give support, eager to protect it, and feels committed to it – all these characterize the emotion of love in other areas as well, including the love between parents and children.

When there is love of the group, everything related is charged with potential emotion. This is manifested when a stimulus appears in an individual's consciousness that is related to the collective (such as a member winning the Nobel Prize or an outbreak of anti-Semitism). Research shows that the more realistic and vivid the stimulus, the stronger the emotion it will arouse. The group as an abstract concept does not have the characteristic of vividness, but the vividness is represented by events, people, objects, and sounds that do have this quality. These might include the Holocaust, Star of David, Albert Einstein, or the Kol Nidrei prayer. Note that the appearance of a stimulus in one's awareness

does not necessarily mean that one is conscious of the stimulus or even the emotion. Recent psychological studies reveal that a large part of human behavior stems from feelings of which the individual is not aware (due to routine, not necessarily repression). Love for the group and one's family seem to be the type of emotion that an individual is often not aware of as a reason for his behavior.

Three aspects of love and attachment to the group, which parallel love and attachment to one's parents, have special relevance for our purposes. First, love for one group does not necessarily preclude love for another group. Just as love for the mother does not come at the expense of love for the father, so too love for the Jewish collective does not come at the expense of love for the American collective, for example. It is possible, of course, that conflict may arise between the two loves, each pulling in the opposite direction. Indeed, the very existence of such conflict indicates the simultaneous existence of clashing loves. Second, the emotion of love can coexist with other and even contradictory emotions toward the same love object. It can exist even though one acknowledges negative features of the love object. Love of children or parents can be mixed with anger, shame, and even hatred toward them. This is also true for love of the group with which the individual identifies. Ambivalence in love relations is common, and often manifested in behavior as well. History, literature, and daily life provide many examples of individuals who have a clear Jewish identity but feel ambivalent toward the Jewish people. The law of contradiction does not apply in the realm of emotion.

But let us distinguish between people who feel mixed love and hatred toward their group and those who acknowledge formal membership in the Jewish collective, but seem to view their Jewishness as wholly negative, as a burden they would willingly shed. In the 1930s, psychologists Theodor Lessing and

Kurt Lewin described this group as “haters of their people” (some call it “Jewish self-hatred”), and offered various explanations. Members of this group do not have a Jewish identity, as we have used the term here, and despite interest in this phenomenon, we will not address it in this paper.

Third, an individual has only limited control over the emotion of love (or other emotions). It is very hard to restrain or extinguish the love of parents and children, and this may also be true of an individual’s love for the group to which he is attached emotionally. Experience suggests that when an individual decides to restrain or erase his feeling of love, he does not uproot the emotion itself. There are examples of people who chose to entirely ignore their group identity, but in special circumstances (such as during the Six Day War), it was aroused and manifested itself.

The argument about attachment to and love for a group returns us to the question we raised above: Why is belonging to a group so significant to an individual that it becomes an important component of his identity, even when this belonging is forced upon him; when he feels ambivalence toward the group; when his emotional attachment to the group is inconsistent with his universalist worldview; when belonging to the group entails suffering; when group identity may circumscribe his autonomy? The preceding discussion proposes an “internal” explanation for this question (as opposed to the “external”, result-oriented explanation that we rejected above). What gives importance and value to belonging to a group is the feeling the individual has toward it. This value is reaffirmed in a variety of situations in which an emotion is rekindled through the course of one’s life. An individual attributes importance and value (sometimes negative) to matters that excite him, whether in the short range, such as pleasure in hearing music, or in the long range, such as sadness over the disappearance of the kibbutz. An individual’s positive emotion toward the group to which he belongs is taken

as evidence of the importance and value that he ascribes to belonging to it. Emotion is the psychological basis, cause, and reason for attribution of value (though there are cases when the attribution of value is the cause of emotion). The internal process of attributing value to something in the wake of excitement from it is sometimes conscious. An immigrant from Russia relates that his conscious appreciation of belonging to the Jewish collective began when he suddenly realized, while living in Russia, how excited he became every time the subject of Jews came up in books or movies. Generally, however, an individual is not conscious of this. When asked why his Jewish identity is important to him, an individual will search for old justifications and new reasons to explain it. In the initial, seemingly natural situation, the individual seems not to feel the need to justify to himself the emotional importance he attributes to belonging to a group or loving his children. The very feelings he has toward the collective provide him with the reason for their importance. Only later will he think about this emotion and try to justify it, as we shall see later.

The feeling of belonging has evaluative, normative, and behavioral aspects. Belonging to a group is not just an emotional stirring in the narrow sense, i.e., a sense of excitement. The emotion of belonging has aspects that pertain to judgments, norms, and behavior, and all these are related to each other. The evaluative aspect is located on a continuum between feelings that are positive (pleasant, joyous, attractive) or negative (annoying, sorrowful, repulsive). With the cognitive development of the individual, more subtle distinctions are added to this dimension, which manifest themselves in complex emotions such as arrogance and envy, remorse and elation. The element of judgment in this emotion is automatic, rapid, and effortless, lacking cognitive interventions like investigation, deduction, or calculation. In this it resembles instant moral judgments that some scholars call *intuitions*, meaning judgments about which the individual

is unconscious of the predisposing factors or processes. Often the individual is not conscious of the judgment contained in an emotion; even when conscious of it, he cannot always control it. Daily life provides much evidence of this. If I feel a positive (or negative) emotion toward a specific person, the positive (or negative) judgment embodied in the emotion will color my perception of the person and his behavior, and could lead to an unconscious bias in my judgment of and behavior toward him. Just as love for a family can bias one's thinking about a member, so too love of a group can bias thinking about a group member, even when he or she is not personally known.

Emotion motivates a person to specific conduct. Zajonc characterizes feelings as instructions about whether to approach or draw away (as opposed to thinking, which teaches what is true and false). The judgment embodied in emotion directs behavior. When an individual waves a flag on Independence Day, he is not necessarily conscious of what motivates his behavior. If we ask what led him to wave a flag, he might say it was patriotism. But it would often be correct to say that waving a flag stemmed from the emotions evoked by it, without any well developed cognitive intervention. In other cases, the influence of emotion over behavior is mediated by cognitive clarifications – the individual is aware of acting out of rational considerations, a desire to express his collective identity. This is true of an individual's conscious decision to participate in activity related to his Jewish identity, though he knows full well that it will entail hardship. We found examples of this among immigrants from the former Soviet Union, who told us in interviews about their willing participation in Jewish courses despite knowing the danger, drawn from their need to express and affirm their sense of belonging.

Now to the normative aspect. A value carries with it the demand or at least recommendation to act in accordance with it. The value latent in emotion toward a group carries with it a sense

of commitment and responsibility toward the group. This is an emotional commitment, and differs from the sense of obligation in the cognitive approach. An emotional commitment arises from love of the collective; it is experienced as internal, as expressing the authentic will of the individual, uncoerced and unaffected by social norms. Diverging from this would evoke a sense of shame in the individual. The cognitive sense of obligation, on the other hand, is sometimes felt to be coerced by social norms or rational principles, such as the golden rule or the principle of reciprocity, which obligates the individual to treat his group as it has treated him, repaying his "debt" to it. Deviating from this obligation will lead to feelings of shame. The rational principle is not, however, imposed from the outside – it is the product of thought, but sometimes felt to be incompatible with "free will" (note that emotion can also be perceived as "external", coerced, but we will not go into this here). An obligation to a group rooted in love for it resembles Hume's description of emotion as the basis of moral motivation. An obligation to a group based on a rational principle resembles Kant's description of moral obligation.

Hence the affect approach responds to the two main shortcomings of the cognitive approach with regard to collective identity. The first is the incompatibility between the cognitive approach and the meaning of Jewish identity as defined in the present discussion. According to this definition, drawn from the life of the individual and a commonly accepted attitude, someone who feels a sense of belonging to the Jewish collective – for whom this belonging is important and seen as a commitment – will be perceived as having a Jewish identity even if he lacks relevant cognitive content (other than the sense of belonging). This perception is inconsistent with the cognitive approach, but compatible with the affect approach. The second shortcoming relates to the motivation of collective identity. The assumption of the cognitive approach – that recognizing what

is right is sufficient to engender appropriate behavior – is not borne out by experience or empirical findings. The affect approach, on the other hand, contains a motivation mechanism. The link between emotion and motivation is in broad consensus in popular psychology and research. Positive emotion motivates (though it does not necessarily cause) behavior that fosters its preservation and reinforcement, while negative emotion motivates behavior that halts or weakens it. Indeed some studies clearly link emotion toward one's ethnic group with group-related behavior, while cognitive variables were not found to be linked with group-related behavior.

5. An integrative approach: Complementary cognitive components

The affect approach to Jewish identity does not minimize the role of cognition in identity. The claim that collective identity is based on the ongoing emotion of love for the group does not contradict the fact that many experience Jewish identity as a rich and complex cognitive construct. In section 3, we looked at the role of cognitive factors in national identity. These include contents such as historical memory, beliefs and values, norms, cultural products of the group, etc. All these find expression in the thought of individuals about their belonging and commitment to the Jewish collective and their striving to know and understand it. If we regard affect as the skeleton of Jewish identity, the cognitive elements would be its body. Emotion addresses the questions, "Who am I? To what group do I belong?" Cognition asks, "What am I and why? What is unique about this group?" The cognitive components provide content and direction to the emotion of collective belonging, while constructing a stable and meaningful identity. Without cognitive components, the emotion of belonging is blind and unstable; it cannot address the individual's need to answer questions of "what" and "why" about his feeling. It is not surprising that these components have continued to be the focus of attention in Jewish identity. The affect approach therefore is inadequate for a full description of actual Jewish identity; it needs complementary components that will describe and explain the rich cognitive facet of that identity. To that end, we turn to the cognitive approach presented above and to other psychological approaches. We ask why, how, and which cognitive elements connect to and integrate with the basic emotional sense of belonging. This is the question we address in this section. We show how the cognitive approach together with the social-cultural approach integrate with the affect approach to provide an inclusive response to this question. The proposed synthesis provides guidelines for an integrative approach to the

development and functioning of Jewish identity, one based on the two previously discussed approaches.

There are two important differences between the integrative and the cognitive approaches. First – with respect to the origin: The integrative approach concedes that cognition plays a key role in shaping collective identity and its functioning, but claims that cognition is not the basis for it; rather, the basis for collective identity is the emotion of belonging to the group. Second – with respect to describing the developmental process: The cognitive approach emphasizes construction by the individual – organizing data and giving meaning to reality in accordance with one’s level of cognitive development. In contrast, the integrative approach gives much weight to messages transmitted by society and culture; love of the group leads to internalization of these messages. The developmental process of collective identity according to the proposed synthesis originates from the feeling of belonging and love for the group, but during the course of this process, the cognitive system takes on a central role in constructing identity. It begins as a servant and complementing the basic emotion of belonging, then it slowly gains control over the forms of expression of this emotion, shaping and constructing it into the overall Jewish identity experienced by the individual, and ultimately it plays a key role in his identity.

Complementary cognitive elements. Let us return to moral development as a model for the development of collective identity. Many psychologists would agree with Adam Smith, David Hume, and others that morality is based on innate emotions, such as a feeling of sympathy for another. Recent research reinforces this view, noting that the individual has predispositions to develop emotions that could be characterized as “moral”. These emotions provide general direction, but are insufficient to instruct about all aspects of moral behavior. They require “complementary components”. These complementary components are drawn from one’s culture and acquired by suitable social experiences. Two

striking examples of such components in the field of morality are norms and reasons. To guide behavior, emotions require a system of definitions and norms. Emotions arouse sensitivity and attentiveness to situations with moral significance, such as harm to the other or the misfortune of poverty, but they are not specific enough to direct behavior and not variegated enough to cope with the complexity of problems that arise with issues like abortion or the just distribution of resources. To that end, culture develops definitions and norms intended to apply the basic emotions in specific situations, and provide answers to problematic situations. Emotions are also in need of reasons or justifications. They need them in order to meet the human need and inclination to be rational, to affirm decisions and behavior, and also to provide guidance in ambiguous situations, when norms do not provide clear direction. The reasons given by an individual to his judgments are of signal importance. Even if some of those reasons are rationalizations applied ex-post facto to justify decisions already taken, once they are formulated over time, it is reasonable to assume that they will influence moral thought, feelings and behavior; after all, they represent beliefs and rationales that the individual considers worthy (or he would not have used them as reasons).

The two types of complementary components that we described, norms and reasons, together with habits that evolve from them, join a complex, dense system of thought and behavior. Without this system, moral emotion is blind and frail. Without these complementary components, moral emotions are cut off from concrete reality, and also – no less important – from the psychological reality of the individual, whose need for clarity, meaning, and rational affirmation is a constitutive element. The integration of moral emotions with these more or less developed complementary components gives rise to what has been described by some scholars as *moral intuitions*, which are expressed in primary moral judgments and behavior.

This model is also valid for collective identity. The following is a schematic description of the development process of this identity, including its complementary cognitive components, according to the integrative approach proposed here. This process can decline or even halt at various points in keeping with the abilities and experiences of the individual. As suggested above, during the initial process of attachment, the child organizes and interprets its impressions and feelings and is gradually able to distinguish between the groups to which it belongs and other groups. This distinction is based on the feeling of attachment – the love of family members – and later, with cognitive development, also on the love of a broad and abstract group such as a nation. Perceived blood relations seem to carry weight in the adolescent's "choice" of group to which he belongs, and this may help explain the phenomenon of adopted adolescents who search for their biological parents; but the decisive factor in this choice seems to be the child's perception of the group to which the parents who raise him belong. When parents and other significant figures perceive the Jewish collective as the group to which they belong, and they feel, judge, and act accordingly, the child too perceives it this way. As the process unfolds, emotion toward the group is complemented by cognitive components: the "realistic" basis of the group, expectations of group members, and so forth, as described below. At the same time, the complementary cognitive components are enveloped by and charged with positive emotions toward people, events, ideas, and symbols associated with the group.

By interaction with those around him, the adolescent during development becomes capable of abstract and critical thinking as well as observing himself from an outside perspective. Through curiosity and striving to understand the world, he will ask increasingly complex questions about his collective identity, such as what is it all about and why should he take it on; what is the nature of his Jewishness (and the sense of belonging at its base)

and why should he hold onto it; and he will strive to affirm his membership in the group. At this stage, the individual arrives at a recognition of some foundations of his belonging to the group – a shared language, history, destiny, and in many cases also content and style of thinking and behaving. If until now the given situation was unquestionably the starting point for the child to understand its connection to the Jewish collective, now it is (also) the individual himself who wants to understand that connection. The adolescent will ask himself, perhaps not fully consciously, questions about whether, to what extent, and why it is important and worthy to maintain his collective identity, through which components, and how. During the course of this development, distinctions are made between various components in the collective identity such as holidays, Israel, the Bible, and – at the more abstract level – religion, nationality, and culture. Some components will be perceived as central to his collective identity, eliciting strong emotion, and others will be perceived as marginal, evoking weak emotion. The intensity of emotion about an element will be affected by factors like the personal and social experiences of the individual and beliefs that are indirectly related to Jewish identity. The complementary cognitive components and their emotional intensity will develop and change through the course of an individual's life and the situations he encounters.

With adolescence and adulthood, questions about Jewish identity become more relevant and urgent. As he takes more important decisions and assumes greater responsibility – for his studies, lifestyle, career, etc. – grappling with these questions becomes more frequent and multi-faceted. Throughout this search and exploration, the individual will have to make decisions and commitments, even on issues about which he does not have clear-cut views. Decisions about the education of one's children are given particular weight in this stage, as they confront the individual with the question of his connection and commitment to his past

and culture. During the extended process of clarifying identity and making binding decisions, the individual will develop a complex structure of emotion, reasoning and behavior, not necessarily coherent, for his collective identity, one that brings together the core emotions, content, and meanings that he constructs and adopts around the identity, and an inclination to draw near to (or distance himself from) the group. The initial love for the group will develop into a complex love that includes a conscious feeling of commitment. The emotion of love will become refined and split into various hues that become interwoven with secondary emotions (whose character is determined by the cognitive component) such as admiration or irony, longing or regret; and his growing closer to the group will develop into a normative perception of belonging to it and adopting its way of life.

As part of the process, the individual will develop strong emotions toward specific elements in the complementary components – events or figures in Jewish history, forms of Jewish literature, the holidays and symbols, and actual situations related to the collective identity. These secondary emotions will have “functional autonomy” (in the words of the psychologist Allport) – an emotional and motivational power of their own. These emotions will strengthen and consolidate the collective identity. Because of their link to vivid “stimuli” and “here and now” situations (like Independence Day), as well as to stable thoughts not contingent upon external stimuli (a common destiny, national independence), these emotions play a decisive role in the ongoing maintenance of the collective identity and in satisfying the need to give it expression.

Synthesis of the dimensions of emotion, cognition, and behavior regarding the group to which one belongs, as shaped through the course of an individual’s life, provides the basis for an “identity response set”. This set includes attention, affect, judgment, and behavioral tendencies that arise in the individual at the appearance of any stimulus connected to the collective

identity. When a small newspaper item about an incident has the slightest whiff of anti-Semitism, an individual with Jewish identity will become attentive, it will evoke emotion in him, he will assess and judge the event, and his assessment will activate a tendency to act. Evocation of an identity response set does not ensure that the individual will act upon it; other considerations may intervene and restrain him, for better or worse. Daily experience, as well as interviews with those who were members of a minority (Jews in the former Soviet Union), suggest that a response set like the one we described is fairly frequent and sometimes evokes a powerful internal experience. It is important to note that a response set like this harbors the risk of rash and biased judgment.

Types of complementary cognitive components. Complementary cognitive components in a profusion of types comprise the content aspect of collective identity. For our purposes, a brief description of four types of such components will suffice. The first are **beliefs** about the “realistic” elements of the collective identity. These include answers to the question, “What common elements form the basis for perceiving the group as distinct, and feeling that one belongs to it?” Members of the group seek to learn about these elements, which include the group’s history, ideas, values, and cultural assets. In complementary components of this type, the individual seeks to affirm his identity, not necessarily discover the objective truth (national myths are one example of this); perhaps this is why the individual and group often avoid meticulous, critical research about these elements. Examples of such components in the Jewish consciousness are the Bible and the Holocaust. A second category of complementary cognitive components relates to **norms** in questions like, “What are the expectations of group members, on what are they based, and to what extent are they binding?” A clear example of these expectations in the Jewish collective is the body of *mitzvot* [religious commandments] and their cultural (including secular) derivatives. Complementary components of this type are perceived

as social conventions about appropriate conduct of the group and its members. Differences of opinion about these components are many and run deep, especially since views have proliferated about Jewish identity that does not rest on observance of the *mitzvot*. The vast majority of these components are learned or internalized without full awareness as a result of exposure to behavior (real or virtual) by “meaningful figures”. But during the course of a lifetime, the individual chooses and adopts personal expectations from a range of available social expectations.

A third type of complementary component relates to principled **reasons** and rationalizations. The individual will seek answers to questions such as, “Why should I ascribe importance to the strong feeling I have for this group? and why to this group and not the entire human race?” Even though we are claiming that the basis of Jewish identity is emotion, it is important for the individual to establish legitimacy for it. He will search for reasons to adopt a feeling of belonging and have it develop into full blown Jewish identity. For many, the very feeling toward the group and fundamental desire for it to flourish, or cognizance of the critical importance of the group in their development and lives, or acknowledgement of the common destiny and loyalty to it are sufficient to feel part of the Jewish people – to perceive Jewish identity as an authentic component that cannot be cast off. Others require a philosophical examination of their belonging and the group’s norms. Complementary cognitive components of this type are generally seen as subjective, rooted in beliefs and values that cannot be proven and hence consensus about them cannot be expected – they emerge from the natural desire of the individual to understand and give meaning to his world, and when they evolve, they affect his understanding of and decisions related to his collective identity.

Another type of complementary component in collective identity is related to the attribution of **purpose**. This type of component has great potential for inspiration and influence.

When an individual acknowledges his Jewish identity and its constituent elements, he may search for purpose beyond the reasons he mustered to justify keeping it. The desire for purpose stems from the human tendency to give "higher meaning" to one's existence as an independent and resourceful agent who acts in accordance with values and free will in a reality forced upon him. The previously described search for reason and justification asks, "Why preserve my collective identity?" The search for purpose asks, "For what purpose should this identity be preserved?" This question underlies the search for purpose and uniqueness in Jewish identity, such as the question posed by the philosopher Hermann Cohen, "How does Judaism contribute to humanity?" The ethos of the collective and its discourse will arouse several purposes from which the individual will adopt – whether consciously or not – those compatible with the context of his life. One obvious example of such a purpose is the perception of Jewish identity as aiming for *tikkun olam* [repair of the world], in various directions and formulations, from a *tikkun* in the spirit of *malkut shadai* [the kingdom of righteousness] to *tikkun* in the spirit of cosmopolitan communism (perhaps explaining the relatively large number of Jews in revolutionary movements). The individual's grasp of purpose can thereby "rebel against" the collective identity from which it grew. To illustrate this form of complementary cognitive component, I quote two students about their Jewish identity: "Belonging to the Jewish people ennobles me; it links me to lofty ideals, from the vision of Isaiah to Marx to the kibbutz"; and "[with my Jewish identity] I am not anonymous; I am a link in a magnificent dynasty." Ideas like this appear in the writings of philosophers, but they also have a place in student interviews.

The four types of complementary cognitive components I cited can be grouped into clusters that are viewed (by the individual) as having internal consistency, each component having implications for the others. For example, perception of the basis of collective identity has implications for perception of the

expectations from group members, and perception of expectations has implications for the reasons for the identity. Examples of these clusters in Jewish identity are identity based on religion, identity based on culture, identity based on nationality, and identity based on social mission, with a range of variations within each.

Levels in the development of collective identity. The types of cognitive components described above are constructed upon each other and represent levels in the development of Jewish identity. (Note, these levels exist concurrently, and are not Piagetian “stages” that replace each other.) I will describe them schematically as follows: At the first level, the individual **grasps** without question that he belongs to the Jewish collective, as described above. At the second level, upon recognizing the elements shared with the group – complementary components of the first type – the individual **acknowledges** belonging to the group as part of the given reality. On the third level, upon recognition of the requirements and expectations of group members – complementary components of the second type – the individual **accepts** belonging to the group, initially out of conformity and later through recognizing the validity of the points in consensus in the group (or, alternatively, he rebels against the group, which can lead in several directions). On the fourth level, after clarifying to himself the reasons he chose to belong to a group that was originally “forced” on him – the complementary component of the third type – the individual **affirms** his collective identity as part of his personal identity. On the fifth level, the individual **shapes** his identity by giving purpose to belonging to this group – complementary component of the fourth type – such as perceiving Jewish identity as a calling and mission. These levels reflect diverse facets of the sense of Jewish identity – choosing and accepting responsibility for it. Various situations and contexts evoke specific facets of collective identity with greater intensity.

These levels in the development and functioning of collective identity are distinguished by three partially overlapping dimensions: (a) from the concrete to the abstract – from a sense of belonging based on shared concrete characteristics such as blood relations, territory, and interests, to an identity based on common values, culture, and mission; (b) from the external to the internal – from an identity based on external factors – the sense of commonality with individuals and a group as a fact, to a self-defined identity rooted in personal choice; and (c) from passivity to activity – from passive recognition of one’s Jewish identity as a given characteristic, through recognition that this identity imposes obligations, through an individual’s sense of obligation to himself by virtue of that choice of identity, to a spontaneous and creative expression of identity by construction and personal interpretation, including a search for purpose.

Factors in the learning process of complementary cognitive components. Many of the complementary cognitive components are inherited as part of the “natural” process of life in the group, a result of observing and trying out patterns of behavior that are frequently repeated by group members – language, lifestyles, thinking, norms, moral preferences, etc. Complementary components of this type are thrust upon the individual, who is usually unaware of their acquisition or connection to the group. Such components include structures of perceiving and thinking (such as the *ipkha mistabra*, or “the contrary is true” approach) and also beliefs and values that are considered givens in this society (such as concern about the group). An outsider would not find it hard to identify features based on complementary components of this type, and would consider these characteristic of the group. But in our era it is doubtful that we could identify characteristics of the *entire* Jewish collective, considering the profusion of cultures in it. Other complementary cognitive components are deliberately conveyed: Parents, society, and the individual himself seek to inherit or bequeath these components in an effort to invest

their Jewish identity with content, such as the study of Jewish history and literature through the ages. The distinction is not sharp between these two types of cognitive components – those deliberately and those not deliberately acquired or transmitted. Deliberately transmitted components find their way into those not deliberately transmitted, and become part of the “natural” process of socialization, oblivious to how they got there.

Two factors that can influence the complementary cognitive components – particularly of the deliberate kind – are the intensity of the individual’s sense of belonging to the group and the messages that the child and adult receive about belonging to the group. Put simplistically, we refer to a continuum of emotional intensity toward the group, from having almost no feeling or deliberately ignoring it, through latent feelings that are aroused only on special occasions, through an ongoing but low-intensity feeling, to an ongoing and very intense feeling. The lack of a sense of belonging to the Jewish collective can stem from the fact that during socialization, the individual did not experience inclusion and commonality with the group, or from the fact that his sense of belonging was channeled primarily in other directions (such as the state rather than the group), or he deliberately reined in or even rejected these feelings due to other considerations, whether conscious or not. (The issue of a lack of a sense of belonging to the group, or even a negative feeling toward it that leads to assimilation is a subject for a separate discussion.) A positive correlation can be assumed between the intensity of feeling toward the group and the individual’s need to understand this feeling and strengthen it. Someone with little feeling toward the group will not bother to examine the subject of belonging to it, and the process of complementary cognitive components will be truncated; on the other hand, someone who has intense (but perhaps not too intense) feelings toward the group will feel a need to understand it. This will be reflected in the scope and depth of

the cognitive components that the individual will adopt, and hence the complexity and robustness of his collective identity.

Other factors that can influence the process of cognitive completion – its intensity and permanence – are the messages and opportunities that the child and adult receive from their environment. Whether deliberately or not, society and culture, in addition to those close to the individual, can encourage or discourage a search for cognitive completion in one area or another (e.g., in the Bible, or in ancient Near East literature, or in modern Hebrew literature, philosophy, etc.); they can provide or obstruct opportunities in the search for cognitive completion; and they can foster the perception of a specific content as sacred or preferred by the individual. These messages and how they are transmitted (which we do not deal with here) can have a critical influence on the motivation and willingness of the child or adult to study a specific content and adopt it as part of their collective identity. Nonetheless we should keep in mind that during formation of the identity, there is also room for the individual's choices, interpretations, and construction. The cognitive complements rest, therefore, both on cultural messages and construction by the individual. This may explain some of the furious disputes over these components.

Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) society in Israel well illustrates the influence of society on the process of searching (or not searching) for complementary cognitive components. This society imbues its members with a powerful emotion about belonging to the Jewish collective, and conveys strict cognitive components. It presents them with a system of beliefs, norms, values, and a lifestyle that seek to provide an answer to every question and a justification for every demand, by fully integrating the individual and collective levels. A system like this makes superfluous and even prevents any deeper search or examination by its members. This differs for someone raised in secular Jewish culture. His feelings for the

Jewish collective can be as powerful as that of the Haredi, and he too will want to sustain and deepen his Jewish identity, but in many cases, he does not know how or why. His Jewishness poses hard questions: What is its essence, what is expected of him as a Jew, what is the rationale for his desire to maintain it, etc. The great diversity in modern times about the perception of Jewishness evokes these questions even more intensely and over time. It leads one to ponder matters that once were in consensus, even self-evident.

Borders and constraints in choosing the complementary cognitive components. When choosing the cognitive components to complement the affect of belonging – the beliefs, norms, reasons, and purpose that respond to an individual’s questions and needs about collective identity – the individual in modern society faces alternatives that are sometimes in conflict. Which factors influence his personal choice (beyond culture and agents of socialization)? Does the choice have limits and constraints? These questions about the content of collective identity are among the most important but least studied. To illustrate the issues that arise, I present here three assumptions about constraints in the choice of cognitive components: (a) Unlike the emotion of wonder that is core to efforts to understand reality, the emotion of love for a group has content and direction. We would therefore expect that the cognitive components will be consistent with the core emotion that “attracts” them, namely, love of the group and the desire to be close to it and help it flourish. A cognitive component that undermines the very existence of the group or the love for it will not, to begin with, be accepted by the individual who is searching for complementary components to complete his sense of belonging. Such subversion could be found among those with a negative emotion toward the group and may be accompanied by an explanation (rationalization?) that reflects their need to justify such a deviant view. (b) The individual will presumably select

components most compatible with his system of beliefs, values, and views (not related to the sense of belonging) so that cognitive dissonance will be minimized. The socialist, for example, will complement his Jewish identity with emphasis on the social facets of Jewish culture, such as the commandment of *yovel* (the injunction to return fields to the original owner after fifty years in order to avoid the accumulation of wealth) and the tradition of mutual support. The capitalist, however, will turn toward biblical verses such as "There will always be poor people in the land" and the charitable traditions among the rich. The universalist will reference, "He who saves a single life, saves the entire world". The particularist, on the other hand, will use the version that refers to saving the life of a Jew. (c) Choice of the complementary cognitive component cannot rest solely on the personal proclivity of the individual, without taking into account accepted standards in the identity collective and its culture. Contents of collective identity must be perceived as legitimate and accepted among a group (if only virtual), though not necessarily among everyone, and it must be anchored in the culture of the group. Without some social consensus and attachment to the culture of the group, the identity cannot be perceived as "collective".

The constraints we listed are "internal", related to the content of collective identity. While they seem to narrow the range of choice of the individual in selecting cognitive components, the many disagreements about these suggest that the range of choices is not narrow. Indeed experience suggests that the defense (or adaptation) mechanisms of an individual can lead him to adopt complementary components that an outsider would view as deviating from the aforementioned constraints – diverging from the emotion of love for the group, the system of beliefs and values, or what the group perceives to be legitimate. The community of Christians in Israel who consider themselves to be Jewish illustrates the broad range for constructing cognitive components.

This range reflects the great diversity in the perception of Jewish identity in contemporary times.

Difficulties in adopting the complementary cognitive components.

During the long process of constructing and developing collective identity, the individual may encounter a range of difficulties. The most obvious – which is not under discussion here – is a practical one, such as social rejection or failing to get a job as a result of one's collective identity. Many cases of conversion are rooted in this difficulty, and sometimes – among some Marranos, for example, or in the case of Heine – the convert searches for a way to return to the collective. Another type of difficulty relates to ideological-emotional issues with the cognitive components – the individual discovers events, ideas, or customs of the group that are incompatible with his feelings or values. For example, he may discover negative aspects, in his opinion, in the history of the Jewish collective, its values or culture. This discovery can lead to double dissonance – the contradiction between his love of the group and his discovery of some negative aspects of it; and the contradiction or gap between some views or values in the tradition of the collective (such as its attitude toward women) and core components of his personal identity (such as the principle of equality among all people). How will he respond to such difficulties? The history of Jewish identity throughout the generations is perhaps the richest text for this fascinating subject, but this is not the place to delve into it. For our purposes, we note that such dissonance often arouses the individual to ask himself who he is and where he is going. Some will choose to abandon the collective after this search; others will repress the dissonance; and some will live with it, accepting the conflict as part of human frailty.

And yet there are some who, despite it all, will respond to such dissonance with a conscious commitment to strengthen and affirm their collective identity. In the words of one interviewee

who was confronted with Jewish *halakha* that conflicted with his sense of justice, "I'm not happy about a lot of things in Judaism. So what? I also have problems with my mother. So what? Should I leave her? It leads me every time to strengthen my ties with her." To the question "why?", the interviewee raised several expected reasons ("She raised me", "I owe her"), but primarily "because she's my mother and I won't let the problems distance her from me" and also "the same thing with Judaism: This is my people, with its good sides and the bad sides that I have the obligation to fight". This interviewee illustrates a fairly common process in which the individual searches his own soul – what is important to him, what does he care about, and can or does he want to continue to maintain his collective identity. The interviewee I quoted chose to be loyal to his group despite the dissonance he felt about it. His identity is now based on emotion drawn from a second level, an emotion that grows through reflecting on the fundamental sense of belonging and cognitive components. This emotion is based on cognition, on attributing value to the sense of collective identity. This process of personal choice out of a sense of responsibility and a commitment to group loyalty gives depth to the identity. Collective identity after a reflection like this is not free of conflict; there may even be more conscious conflicts than there had previously been. But the individual perceives them as an informed choice based on independent thought – unlike the initial identity into which he was "thrown", the one based on emotion. This dynamic – a conscious commitment to identity following critical reflection – is not rare. Reflection does not necessarily require agonizing soul-searching; usually it is quick and one is barely aware of it.

6. Integration of cognition and affect in collective identity

Affect and cognition are woven into all aspects of our lives and they generally work well together. Joy comes together with the belief that something good happened, and sadness comes together with the belief that something not good happened. One can expect combinations like this in the case of collective identity as well. Indeed, in the above analysis we chose to speak about complementary cognitive components – knowledge and belief that complement the emotion, residing together amicably and not in conflict. Complementary cognitive components in and of themselves do not stand in opposition to the feeling of belonging; similarly, the feeling of belonging is not opposed to the cognitive set of identity. The integration of emotion and cognition in collective identity is natural: love of the group gives rise to the need and desire to understand and explain the attachment to the group and what ensues from that, while cognition supplies emotion with a framework, content, and stability as it draws vitality and motivation from it. We should expect, therefore, full integration of these two components, complementing each other. Day-to-day experience and research, however, fail to confirm this harmonious picture.

Conflict between emotion and cognition. Cognition and emotion are distinct from each other in their functioning. As noted earlier, emotion is aroused in response to a stimulus or concrete situation, usually external; it focuses on a relatively narrow stimulus while ignoring the overall context; it is immediate, reflexive, effortless, and usually transient; and it is powerful, commensurate with the intensity of the stimulus or the specificity and intensity of the situation. The emotion felt at the sight of a bleeding child will be stronger than the emotion felt upon hearing news that thousands of children are starving in Darfur. Cognition, on the other hand, relates to the broad

context of the stimulus or situation facing the individual, a context beyond the here-and-now; it strives to reveal the truth, and its nature is to probe and explore – to achieve the maximum information and considerations concerning the subject at hand. Therefore, cognition entails a vigorous search for meaning and for validity of the perception and judgment at its core; it is slow, but steady. These differences between emotion and cognition set the stage for conflict in the consciousness and behavior of an individual, also with respect to collective identity. When a situation in the consciousness of an individual is related to collective identity, such as his country's success in the Olympics, the emotion of pride is evoked based on an assessment of the situation and a desire to maintain it. Immediate emotion is an important factor in the ability of an individual to survive and adapt to his environment; it ensures attention and the ability to react quickly to a threatening or favorable situation. As noted, however, emotional characteristics can lead to rash and distorted assessments or judgments (or even paralysis, in the case of terror). The immediate emotional assessment tends to focus on considerations that are for the good of the collective to which the individual belongs, and tends to ignore considerations (such as moral ones) that are inconsistent with the interests of the collective. The individual's cognitive-reflective reaction, based on a range of considerations including complementary cognitive ones, follows the emotional reaction, which it must overcome and sometimes reject. But such rejection does not come easy. The more cognitive or emotional pressure on an individual, the harder it is for him to restrain or reject the emotional reaction (e.g., to prefer someone from his group over an outsider). Thus a conflict can arise between emotion and cognition in matters related to collective identity. When an individual rationally examines his emotion in a specific situation, he recognizes that the influence of emotion could have been biased; and he sometimes does want to restrain or reject it.

The conflict between emotion and cognition is not merely a “local” conflict such as the one we just described, but also appears on the level of principle. An example of this in western, liberal culture is the ambivalent attitude to national identity. For many, the concept “national identity” evokes both positive and negative associations. National identity is associated with loyalty, solidarity, and belonging. It is also associated with racism, discrimination, and xenophobia. Each of these associations includes both an emotional and a cognitive aspect. This ambivalence reflects an internal conflict concerning national identity and issues related to it, including patriotism. Adorno offers a distinction between positive and negative patriotism, but almost entirely ignores patriotism of the first type and addresses in his work only patriotism he considers negative. On the other hand, there are scholars like MacIntyre, who examine primarily the positive aspects of patriotism and make concerted efforts to defend it from the opposite view. Choosing between the two horns of the dilemma, whether by thought or intuition, will often be based on the legitimacy and weight that an individual accords each aspect, the emotional and cognitive, in a given context.

The conflict between a particularistic and universalist approach. On a higher level of generalization, tension between cognition and emotion can be manifested in the conflict between different worldviews about human nature and justice. Such is the conflict between the particularistic and universalist approaches to decision making. A particularistic approach leads to a decision based on the entirety of conditions in a specific situation, including personal attitudes toward the parties involved. A universalist approach, on the other hand, leads to a decision based on general principles and laws, while deliberately ignoring one’s attitude view toward the specific case and those involved in it. This formulation places the two approaches into the realm of cognition, but they differ from each other in their attitudes to the emotional component

of an individual's identity. The particularistic approach tends to treat personal emotion as a consideration with moral standing, while the universalist approach tends (though not necessarily) to minimize it.

An example of this conflict was found when Jewish respondents in Israel were asked to choose to which of two patients with a rare blood type they would donate their blood, if there was only enough for one; in all relevant senses, the two patients were similar. The choice was between donating blood to a member of one's own group (Jewish or, in another experiment, French-Canadian), donating to someone from a different group (Arab or, in the other experiment, Anglo-Canadian), or donating to the one chosen randomly. As expected, the respondents could be categorized by the reasons they gave for their choice into those with a particularistic approach, who believed that emotion and commitment to their group imposed a "special obligation" (in the language of several philosophers) toward members of their own group, and those with a universalist approach, who believed that the principle of equality does not allow for partiality based on belonging to the collective (none cited hostility to the other group). More than a few respondents explicitly noted a gap between their emotional and "rational" inclinations: "Emotion tells me to prefer the Jewish patient, but my mind tells me it's forbidden to discriminate based on blood." When given the opportunity to reconsider their decision about who would receive the blood donation, many respondents changed their minds, more changing from the particularistic position (to donate to someone from their own group – a more emotional decision) than from the universalist decision (to select the recipient randomly – a more "principled" decision). Many respondents related (in an interview after the experiment) that the decision made them uncomfortable: as if two "I's" exist inside them – I the emotion and I the mind – each pulling in a different direction, so

that either decision would hurt one of them. Research reveals that the distinction between emotional and cognitive functioning in matters of national identity moves from a concrete rivalry between the two functions to an abstract, principled acceptance of emotion as a legitimate consideration, rather than denying its validity as a consideration. (I note in passing that respondents who ostensibly had a particularistic approach, partial to members of their own group, generalized this judgment to the Canadian case. Partiality to one's own group is therefore not necessarily incompatible with a universalist position in which preference for one's own group is taken to be a general principle).

7. Some emerging thoughts about Jewish identity

A core argument of this paper is that Jewish identity is based on a feeling of belonging and commitment to the group to which appropriate complementary cognitive components were added to infuse content and sustainability. This argument has important implications, both theoretical and practical, concerning the Jewish identity of the individual.

The validity and status of affect in Jewish identity. We cannot imagine a person who weighs alternatives, makes choices, and takes decisions without emotions to set goals and motivate him toward them. Indeed research reveals that injury to the area of the brain that controls emotions causes disturbances in decision making. In their developed state, emotions are based on knowledge and understanding accrued during human evolution and gathered by the individual from his experience and learning. Such emotions are the cornerstone of what we called the "identity response set". Like moral intuition, the source of this set is not conscious to the individual, and until manifested in judgment or behavior, it appears not to be open to observation or control. Research suggests, however, that the repository of experience and knowledge available to emotions and non-reflective responses could be richer than the repository available to the conscious memory. One must not ignore, of course, the limitations of these responses, which have not been consciously tested and could bias judgment, as noted above. But one must also not ignore the experience that underlies them. The speed and ease of the immediate response set afford it an important advantage in the functioning of the individual. The identity response set heightens attention to relevant situations, broadens access to related subjects, and can save the individual needless indecisiveness about problems he has already dealt with. An instructive example from literature, though certainly not representative, about the merit of a non-reflective response is the behavior of Huckleberry

Finn, Mark Twain's hero, who refrained from turning in his friend Jim, an escaped slave, despite his awareness that he ought to do so, as required by law.

All this leads to the next argument. Psychologically, it is hard to accept the view that the feeling of belonging to a group (the love for it) is a weakness or mental defect that should be eliminated. Indeed, this feeling of belonging is a critical element in an individual's sense of wellbeing, happiness, and the meaning he gives to his life. A great many people feel they belong to the Jewish collective (or to another ethnic or national collective); they feel love and commitment to the group (which does not prevent them, as noted above, from simultaneously feeling contrary and critical emotions toward it). They perceive belonging to a group to be an essential part of their identity. They not only feel unwilling to give up this sense of belonging, they also believe they have the right and even obligation to give it expression in their lives. In this sense, the emotion is a kind of latent commitment – the sense of belonging is inextricably bound up with a commitment to the group, even if the individual is unconscious of it. This sense of belonging is accorded the status of being a consideration in his thoughts – one consideration among others such as morality or self-interest. When a conflict arises between this consideration and others, it will be resolved like any internal conflict, such as that between a moral consideration and self-interest. Often a solution will be sought that balances the considerations. It is important to remember that the existence and intensity of the sense of belonging, even if it is an indisputable fact of human nature, do not automatically make it a quality that should be nurtured, nor should it be immune from criticism. Dismissing this emotion out of hand, however, would be arrogant, fly in the face of reality, and be an affront to human dignity.

Openness, pluralism, and flexibility in the perception of Jewish identity. The emotional component of Jewish identity brings

with it personal, creative, and flexible qualities. This contrasts with the cognitive component, whose dominant qualities are social, structured, and stable. The starting point of the emotional component is the individual, his love of the collective and his concern for it: "I care about this group; therefore I belong to it." The starting point for the cognitive component is the collective: "I acknowledge my belonging to this group, therefore I ought to care about it." The emotional aspect of the feeling of identity is greatly affected by the context of the individual's reality, and therefore open to change not just in intensity, but also in meaning. Emotional fluctuations in the sense of identity through diverse contexts present the individual with new situations that require and allow for creativity and flexibility in his interpretation and expression of identity. In its cognitive aspect, on the other hand, collective identity is structured and relatively permanent. It is shaped by tradition and social consensus, which delineate borders and a structure, including the *mitzvot* (not necessarily religious) of "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not". The perception of Jewish identity as having an emotional basis with complementary cognitive components thus posits a relatively open, flexible, and dynamic structure, one that can accommodate diverse personal content. The individual's Jewish identity can have a religious or secular orientation, traditional or aesthetic, nationalist or humanist, emotional or rational, or even one that interweaves seemingly contradictory elements; its salient components can change in changing circumstances and times. Although the common emotional basis provides an anchor and boundaries, thereby preventing chaos, it leaves open space in which a variety of contents can coexist in dialogue. This model of Jewish identity is open and flexible, but at the same time turbulent and vulnerable to controversy and shakeups. More about this in the concluding section.

Indeed throughout history and especially in the modern era, very different trends evolved in the Jewish collective that

have been perceived as legitimate forms of Jewish identity, from Haredi to secular, from Bundist to Zionist. This very fact counters the claim that national identity inhibits the development and flowering of cultures within the national group. Nevertheless, the question remains: In light of its history, is Jewish identity special in its openness to diverse trends within it? Will it continue this way when the State of Israel serves as a central axis of its identity?

The motivating force of the sense of belonging. We have proposed that the sense of belonging to a group is the inner motivational core of Jewish identity (rather than external factors such as group pressure). This emotion is the force motivating the individual to understand and justify his belonging to a group, and to give it meaning via complementary cognitive components, and it is core to the individual's feeling of commitment to his identity. However, the influence of this commitment on the individual's behavior or expressions of his Jewish identity is limited. Often, there is a large gap between commitment and behavior. For example, when Israeli schoolchildren are asked whether it is important and "necessary" to study the Bible, most answer in the affirmative, and give reasons based on the link between the Bible and their belonging to the Jewish state and collective – these children "internalized" the link between the Bible and their collective belonging. Regarding their Bible lessons, however, the children show very low motivation. How can this gap be reconciled?

For our purposes here, let us distinguish between two sources of motivation – the sense of the worthy and the sense of attraction (or repulsion). In the sense of the worthy, the individual feels, senses, and recognizes the "good" of specific behavior and deduces that it ought to be done, but it is not perceived as obligatory – one should behave this way, but it is not compulsory here and now. In the sense of attraction, the individual feels a desire and attraction for specific behavior, whether physical such

as eating or psychological such as solving a riddle. The feeling of belonging can kindle both the sense of worthiness and attraction. Certain situations awaken the feeling of belonging to the point of desire and drive to give it immediate expression, such as when an individual seeks to defend his group from attack by others. But some contexts, such as Bible lessons, do not kindle emotion to the point of behavior and attraction. Passing from "ought" to actual behavior depends on a number of factors, an important one of which, for our purposes, is society's attitude toward and judgment of the subject. The Holocaust provides an illustrative example. In recent decades, Israeli students show strong motivation to study about the Holocaust, unlike the lack of such motivation in the first decades of the state. The transition to strong motivation happened in parallel with the change in the Israeli public's approach to the subject of the Holocaust, and one can surmise a connection between the two.

The complementary cognitive components are indeed nourished by the perception of worthiness that is rooted in the feeling of belonging. People feel they ought to be loyal to the group to which they belong, inter alia by adding more cognitive components. But this perception of worthiness is often not interpreted as a here-and-now obligation, nor is it manifested in behavior. The connection between perceiving what is worthy and actual motivation poses a difficult challenge in the study of motivation, and this includes the area of collective identity.

The individual and the collective facets. In the sociological distinction between a communal, collectivist orientation marked by one's commitment and deference to the goals of the group, and an individualistic orientation, in which one attributes decisive importance to personal goals, an identity based on a sense of belonging is by nature biased in favor of the community. In modern society, however, where the individualistic orientation dominates the vast majority of life, Jewish identity must also

have a facet suitable for this orientation, and Jewish identity as described in this paper indeed has one. The inherent nature of Jewish identity is belonging to the group, rooted in love for and closeness to the group; and the motivating force underlying this is concern for and loyalty to the group. But Jewish identity (in its developed form) is also a constitutive factor in the free choice of an individual and the commitments he undertakes; it is an expression of his autonomy; and the loyalty of the individual to himself carries great weight in the motivating force that directs it. These two facets of Jewish identity are not mutually exclusive. They are accepted as givens, as part of the human condition, even when there is conflict between them.

Nevertheless it is possible to distinguish between those with Jewish identity for whom the individualistic facet is salient – those whose Jewish identity is wholly made up of their consciousness and commitment to themselves, and those whose collectivist facet is salient for them – whose Jewish identity is manifested in the experience of membership in and loyalty to the group. But these are not separate paths or successive developmental stages of Jewish identity. The “individualist type” could find himself overwhelmed by the vastness of membership in a national collective, while the “collectivist type” could find himself overwhelmed by inner turmoil about his Jewish identity. Each of these types is vulnerable to the risk of psychological “detachment”. Those of the individualistic identity could become detached or alienated from the realistic group belonging, which is core to their Jewish identity, while those of the collectivist identity could become detached or alienated from their individual identity, caught up in the crowd, and yield to uncontrolled conformity. As in other areas, here too the facets may balance each other out, producing a general autonomous Jewish identity.

Collective identity as love of the group. The claim that a feeling of belonging forms the basis for Jewish identity posits

a “user-friendly” perception of the emotion of belonging to a group. In contrast with the view that an adversarial relationship to another group is a constitutive element in collective identity and the emphasis on contrarian elements or even animosity toward the other, the approach we present here bases groupness on a connection with and love for the group itself, not on hostility to others or conditional upon utility to the individual (beyond the love). This approach explains why the positive qualities of collective identity – solidarity, loyalty, and responsibility – overcome (when they overcome) the egoistical qualities. A collective identity based on love for and connection to a group is not meant to arouse animosity to another group; it leaves room for appreciation, connection, and sympathy for the other. Furthermore, it can be assumed that collective identity of this kind fosters and is even a necessary condition for a positive, empathetic, and accepting approach toward those who belong to another group. Only someone who has experienced positive feelings of national belonging can place himself in the shoes of another who has parallel feelings of belonging, or can understand, respect, and feel empathy for him. Nevertheless, it is essential to keep in mind that even if love for one’s group is a necessary condition for a positive opinion of another group, we know from human experience that it is not sufficient. Indeed, patriotism really is sometimes the last refuge of the scoundrel; it does not guarantee sympathy for the patriotism of the other. The question is, under what conditions does connection to and love for the group lead to understanding and empathy for the other, and when does it lead to hatred?

Giving affective expression to identity. The individual seeks to give expression to his identity. In some areas, such as ideology, he feels not just the need, but the obligation to express his identity; in other areas, such as the aesthetic-experiential, he feels a need, but perhaps not an obligation. Jewish identity includes the two areas we mentioned: the ideological – related primarily

to the cognitive side of identity – and the experiential – related primarily to its emotional basis. The feeling that one ought to give expression to Jewish identity on the ideological-cognitive plane is relatively evident and the individual is conscious of it. It forms the basis for activities such as the study of Jewish texts. The experiential plane is different, however. The study of texts could also serve as an answer to the need for experiential expression and, whether consciously or not, it is also designed to do so, but it does not appear to respond to the entire range of the experiential need. The richness of emotion and the fog enveloping it make it difficult to define the essence of the experiences that would satisfy the emotional-experiential need, though life experiences suggest that it differs from those in the cognitive field. One clear difference is that cognition incorporates the encounter with ideas and concepts, while experience incorporates the encounter with people, activities, and situations (real or imagined), with plots, texts, and ritual; and not just in direct verbal encounters, but also through others forms of expression like literature, song, dance, or voluntary activity of all sorts. These encounters also make a unique contribution to the cognitive aspect of identity, both in terms of motivation and content. Hence, recognizing the role of emotion in Jewish identity calls for reexamination of the characteristics and requirements of this identity, such as the importance of philosophical study and norms versus the importance of emotion and the overall way of life. The important point for this discussion is that the experiential side, closely related to the emotional and aesthetic side, is a necessary part of the set of activities that responds to the human need to give expression to identity, especially in the secular world.

The behavioral dimension. Our discussion has dealt at some length with two of the three key dimensions in developmental and social psychology – cognition and emotion – but relatively little with the third dimension – behavior. This dimension has

come up in diverse contexts: as a dependent variable – the feeling of belonging to a group leads the individual to become close to the group and motivates him to behavior that promotes it; and as an independent variable – the behavior of the individual influences his definition of self. Nevertheless, the absence of more in-depth discussion about the dimension of behavior might appear surprising. It seems to contradict the key role that behavior plays in Jewish religion and society. Jewish identity is perceived by many as intimately bound up with a way of life expected from members of the group.

However, the perception of Jewish identity used here seems free of the obligation to perform *mitzvot* of any sort. What then is the meaning of commitment in Jewish identity? For our purposes here, let us distinguish simplistically between passive and active commitment. Passive commitment does not mean abandoning the group – the individual preserves the sense of belonging to the group and expresses this to himself. He thus affirms the importance of this group for himself. Active commitment, on the other hand, is to behave in accordance with the social requirements that an individual undertakes with respect to his collective identity. This dichotomy is simplistic because, *inter alia*, even those with passive commitment will feel the need to give some social expression to their identity, while those with active commitment will give themselves permission to choose which requirements are “mandatory” and which not. At any rate, the distinction sharpens the question about whether Jewish identity constructed on passive commitment is sustainable. It appears *prima facie* that such an identity would flit into an individual’s consciousness only infrequently, that there would be few concrete manifestations of it in his life, and the significance for him would slowly dissipate. In secular, multicultural, and individualistic culture, a thin identity like this is relatively common, and one should not belittle its “minimalist” expression, such as the

individual's mere acknowledgement that he belongs to the group. Indeed, one can point to people whose Jewish identity seems to exist exclusively in their private world; some say that many Jews in the former Soviet Union maintained their Jewish identity this way for a long period. But the example itself indicates the fragility of such an identity.

A note about educating for collective identity. Without going deeply into the normative question about the right to educate for national identity and the pedagogical methods involved, let us say that educators and thoughtful people cannot escape this issue. Basing national identity on the feeling of belonging enlarges and sharpens the debate. First, psychological and educational analyses reveal that in giving expression to Jewish identity, the individual not only satisfies one of his deep needs, but also empowers his identity – he affirms his self-definition both in terms of content (“this is me and this expresses me”) and commitment (“I do meet my commitment to the group”). Thus, giving expression to national identity, a need that cannot be denied to the individual, means “educating” for national identity, though not necessarily intentionally. Second, because the world we live in is suffused with messages that influence one’s national identity in addition to many other values; avoiding this issue is therefore not neutral, and in fact conveys a clear message, especially in light of the flood of emotions flowing from the media, many related to collective identity. Third, and this is the main point, because the mission and obligation of an educator and spiritual leader is to help the young person – or adult – find himself and his path in this confusing and sensitive area. In light of the legitimate concerns about indoctrination in educating for Jewish identity, particularly via experiential means, it is important to note that the deliberate use of emotional experiences is not necessarily brainwashing more than any other educational activity. Experiential tools, like cognitive tools, can be exploited for indoctrination and closing

minds, or for educationally opening them and examining views. An emotional experience can be an excellent platform – and sometimes a necessary one – for holding an open and critical examination of Jewish identity, where there is more than just wild and amorphous emotion. However, in the same breath we must repeatedly recall that the dangers of indoctrination and nationalism are always lurking, not just in experiential, but also in cognitive activities.

In Closing

Almost every human experience interweaves cognitive aspects (“what is happening and why”) with evaluative and emotional aspects (“this is good or bad”, “this is joyful or sad”). For most parts of our lives, the cognitive aspects dominate on the conscious level: We wish to know and understand everything of importance to us; through analogies and inferences, we go beyond the given knowledge; and the composite of accumulated knowledge forms the basis for our thoughts, decisions, and behavior. This knowledge is supposed to be “objective”, free of emotional influence that could bias our judgment. As early as the 1950s, however, psychological research revealed that evaluation (on a good-bad continuum) is a key dimension in the meaning of words: Every statement and perception entails an evaluation that has an emotional aspect – we don’t merely see “a picture”, but “a beautiful picture” (or “a non-beautiful picture”). In recent decades, psychological research about emotions has greatly evolved, managing to reveal even unconscious emotions (in the non-Freudian sense) and thereby enhancing our ability to expose their significant influence on the thoughts, judgments, and behavior of the individual. After years of almost ignoring the role of emotion in human behavior, today it is returning to the forefront of our attention. This paper is one example with respect to the study of Jewish identity.

An individual does not generally ask himself which of the two facets dealt with in this paper – the emotional or the cognitive – is the basis for his Jewish identity. But how he comprehends the basis and meaning of Jewish identity does influence his thinking and behavior about everything related to being Jewish. Understanding the role of emotion and cognition in Jewish identity is therefore of interest not just to the curious scholar, but also to those involved in a practical way with subjects related to Jewish identity, from educators to community leaders.

It is not the intent of this paper to provide recipes for education or leadership. The influence of cognition and emotion on Jewish identity takes complex directions, each affected by the specific individual, family, community, and situation. But it is possible to sketch in broad brushstrokes the individual's perception of his Jewish identity and what the implications of this are for the vitality of this identity and its influence on his life.

For example, if an individual grasps his Jewish identity to be based on culture and norms of behavior, he may look around and wonder, "Does this group actually have a common culture and way of life?" And someone who perceives his Jewish identity to be based on a worldview and common values may declare after some consideration, "I do not accept Judaism's worldview and system of values, as presented to me." On the cognitive level, people with this view cannot affirm their Jewish identity. If it is dependent on the cognitive factors I cited – culture or worldview – Jewish identity is not acceptable to them or their logic. It is possible that they cannot disavow the identity – many will acknowledge that "on an emotional level", it is hard for them to dissociate from their Jewish identity, but on the cognitive level, they do regard it as valid. Some may struggle successfully or not with this "emotional disturbance". Some will accept their Jewish identity as the default – not by heavenly decree, which would bring commitment, but as a formal label that lacks inner meaning.

For others, the feeling of belonging and group loyalty has salience and validity in affirming their Jewish identity. They too will ask, "What is Jewish culture and the way of life" and will be amazed at the diversity of response to this question among those considered members of the Jewish collective. And they too may not be in agreement with the beliefs, values, and way of life accepted by the Jewish collective. But these questions will not necessarily undermine their Jewish identity (in their own eyes) – an identity for which the emotion of belonging and commitment

to the group is decisive. In the words of the respondent quoted earlier, "...This is my people, with its good sides and the bad sides that I have the obligation to fight". Individuals like this, who recognize the validity of their feeling of belonging, may find it easier to cope with internal conflicts between various components of Jewish identity as the emotional approach is more open to contradictions and unresolved enigmas.

Needless to say, distinguishing between people of cognition and people of emotion is intended only for purposes of discussion. As noted earlier, the Jewish identity of every individual includes aspects of both. But even though theory and reality both affirm the need for and value of combining emotion and cognition, western culture seems to steer the individual to a rational-cognitive approach. This direction has ancient roots, which deepened with the rise and influence of science. The trend continues today, too, despite the current flurry of research interest in emotion. The prevalent expectation is that the individual's Jewish identity will be based more on cognition than emotion, more on an educated worldview than quick intuitions, more on conscious and stable thought than transient "gut feelings". This expectation does not match the picture drawn in this paper, either theoretically – regarding the role of emotion in Jewish identity – or normatively – regarding the characteristics that are ascribed to it. The feeling of belonging to a national collective or other group is a solid, seemingly universal experience. People feel a closeness and commitment to their group, they desire and work toward its success, sometimes through self-sacrifice.

One important question raised by this paper is whether the anchor provided by the emotion of belonging is sufficient to secure Jewish identity in the roiling sea of "cognitive" disagreements within the contemporary Jewish collective. Can collective identity sustain itself without a core nucleus of beliefs and values acceptable to the members of the group (beyond recognition of

a common destiny)? The present examination of the sense of belonging refers us to the possibility that the emotion of belonging itself offers such a core. As noted, the feeling of belonging is not devoid of content. It contains content charged with emotion with which the complementary cognitive components must be in accord. For example, the feeling of belonging to a group contains an empathetic-social orientation in conflict with the economic-instrumentalist orientation that dominates our world; it carries a sense of commitment and responsibility to the group members and through this to the other in general; it entails the individual's recognition of an obligation to the historical memory of the group; it carries a desire to search for content and meaning in the cultural assets of the group and thereby in other groups. All these (inter alia) have solid foundations in Jewish culture. But are these "abstract" contents, which are interpreted in so many different ways, sufficient to sustain a multicolored and complex Jewish identity...and to ensure its vitality?

Psychologically, the feeling of collective identity – Jewish, in this case – carries, as noted, both risk and opportunity. The risk is that such feelings can lead to arrogance, insularity of thought and behavior, bias in judgment, hostility, and discrimination. The world around us provides terrible proof of this risk. This essay, which emphasizes the role of emotion in collective identity, reinforces our fears of these dangers. The fears are buttressed by the characteristics of emotion about which we have been warned from time immemorial. In counterpoint, however, lies opportunity. Collective identity is guided by values and culture, not by special interests. Collective identity reflects a move away from egoism toward a commitment to a group, toward people unknown to the individual. This commitment can leverage more comprehensive social commitment. An individual aware of his collective identity and its role in his life can be expected to show understanding of the other, someone with a collective identity and group of his

own. While hostility to other groups is rampant and cruel, let us not ignore the many instances of sympathy and support for other groups. Such sympathy rests upon an individual's empathy for and sense of belonging to his own group. In any case, in the absence of evidence that this kind of emotion can radiate toward the entire human collective based on our common fate of having been thrust unbidden into the world, it is incumbent upon us to continue our search for how to prevent the danger and strengthen the opportunity in particularistic collective identity.

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